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BOOK REVIEW
Russell K. Osgood *
Hitler's Justice: The Courts of the Third Reich. By Ingo Miller. Translated from the German by Deborah Lucas Schneider. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1991. Pp. xviii, 349. $29.95.
Introduction
Contrary to the suggestion of its English title,1 Hitler'sJustice: The Courts of

the Third Reich, is an attempted comprehensive treatment of the origins,
workings, and post-war survival of Nazism and its supporters in Germany's
legal order. I say "attempted" because while the book is comprehensive in
topical coverage, it occasionally appears to be a gathering of anecdotes
2
rather than a detailed investigation and report.
I.

The Failure of the German Legal System

Ingo MUller makes a powerful case that the German legal order, particularly its judges, welcomed Hitler, knowingly and flexibly accommodated
3
legal outrages that secured the Nazis in power after the Reichstag fire,
and then comprehensively participated in a human Holocaust against
Jews, Poles, numerous dissidents, and the disabled. He presents a breathtaking and nauseating story, even if incomplete, that is made worse by
German and Allied efforts to ignore it or cover it up in the rush to rehabilitate Germany after the war.4 The active and enthusiastic connivance of
leading German legal academics at each stage in the Nazi period is particularly sickening. 5
* Allan K. Tessler Dean of the Law Faculty and Professor of Law, Cornell Law
School.
1. The German title is FurchtbareJuristen:Die unbewdltigte Vegangenheit unsererJustiz
(Dreaded Lawyers: Unheeded Lessons from the History of Our Courts). Walter
Weyrauch has also noted the title's change as translated into English and has written an
interesting comment on how the book must be viewed very cautiously not only for comparative law reasons, but also and perhaps more significantly in light of inter-generational conflicts within Germany about the Nazi period. See Walter Otto Weyrauch,
Comment, Limits of Perception:ReaderResponse to Hitler'sJustice, 40 Am.J. Comp. L. 237
(1992).
2. Some chapters, such as the one on German law schools, are particularly thin.
INGO MOLLER, HrrLER'SJusTIcF: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 235-39 (1991).
3. Id. at 27-35, 46-47.
4. Id. at 209-92.
5. Id. at 68-70.

28

CORNELL INT'L

LJ. 461 (1995)

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

Vol. 28

The book reveals a vast and inexplicable complicity in Nazi domination of the legal order. Nazi leaders first mercilessly twisted the emergency power provisions of the Weimar Constitution 6 and eventually
ignored the entire Constitution. 7 The Nazis spawned vague laws that presupposed and advanced phantasms of ethnic or genetic purity. 8 They
applied penal laws retroactively to cover conduct which was not criminal
when undertaken, 9 and manipulated the language of statutes to serve Nazi
ends. 10 The courts even went beyond statutory interpretation to impose
sanctions (including the death penalty) that were not mandated" under
law and to include as possible defendants categories of people not listed in
the legislation. 12 The leadership created special courts to handle antiNazi or anti-state "dissent."' 3 These courts proceeded in secret, 14 dispensed with virtually all procedural safeguards in the criminal process, 15
and served as the handymen of the execution apparatus of the Third
Reich. Finally, military courts displaced civil tribunals in many legal areas
6
as the military situation deteriorated.'
In addition to the changes in substantive law, all aspects of German
legal culture were made to conform to Nazi values. For instance, the legal
profession and legal academia were simultaneously "cleansed" of Jews,
non-Jewish liberals, and other dissenters. 17 The Reich justice ministry' s
and the courts 19 were composed of servants, not of the law, but of a Ffihrer and his slavish political party whose power base was largely extra-legal.
II. Mffller's Reasons for the Legal Failure
When the legal order fully and formally participates in implementing a
policy of ethnic cleansing and mass homicide, it is natural to look for a
cause or causes. Muller's book is a serious effort to evaluate the suggestion, attributed to the late Lon L. Fuller,20 that Germany's attachment to
legal positivism, 2' a jurisprudential theory which denies that there is any
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
known

Id. at 4649.
Id. at 46, 49.
Id. at 90-119.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 72-73, 90-119.
Id. at 134-36.
Id. at 106-109. All of this was in derogation of the ancient Roman maxim, widely
in Germany. "Nulla crima sine legis."

13. Id. at 140-52.
14. Id. at 170-73.
15. Id. at 140-52.

16. Id. at 183-91.
17. Id. at 59-67.
18. Id. at 82-84.
19. Id. at 36-41.
20. See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism andFidelity to Law-A Reply to ProfessorHart, 71 HARV.
L. REv. 630 (1958).

21. Id. at 632-33. Positivism is an approach to jurisprudence which is thought to
claim that law is exhaustively defined by reference to the official texts or canons which
allegedly created it.
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necessary connection between law and morality,2 2 was a major contributing factor. Mfiller argues, by way of refutation, that the Nazis and their
judicial sympathizers employed an extravagantly anti-formalist legal
28
approach that was anti-positivist.
Mfiller's evidence against the positivism-as-cause theory is quite convincing if one equates positivism with formalism. H.L.A. Hart's seminal
contributions, gathered together in chapters six and seven of his book The
Concept of Law,24 suggest that one cannot accurately equate these two jurisprudential phenomena. It is, nevertheless, interesting to note the extent
to which an order dominated by positivist theory disregarded considerations of legal formality. It is as though Austin's unlimited sovereign 25 (in
this case Hitler) rises to deny, in advance of delineation, the careful limitations placed on him by Hart's rule of recognition.2 6 In summary, it seems
a non-sequitur to Fuller's argument to say that the Nazis were radical antiformalists.
My own reaction is that Fuller's basic point, that a divorcing of law
and morality is descriptively wrong and also dangerous, remains uncontradicted. However, it is also true that the supporters of approaches akin to
Fuller's, by licensing the importation of "personal moral" theories, may
have encouraged racist Nazi judges to pour their weird venom into the
law's generalities as a form of Aryan social "morality." Thus, in the end,
perhaps both positivists and anti-positivists share some blame for this
27
dreadful episode in the history of Western legalism.
In place of positivism-as-scapegoat, Miller offers the view that the
facilitation of Nazism was attributable to the fact that the German judiciary
of the 1930s was dominated by anti-democratic monarchists educated
before World War 1.28 The judiciary regarded the Weimar Republic and
its legal system as weak and contemptible. 29 Curiously, Mfiller never
definitively indicates whether this clique of judges had any developed
notions of due process or the rule of law. At points he suggests that they
did, such as when he discusses the degradation of legality in the Weimar
period.3 0 However, his argument also suggests that they did not, when he
22. See R.W.M. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE 331-35 (5th ed. 1985). But see Neil MacCormick, Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals, in NATURAL LAW THEORY'

CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 105 (Robert P. George ed., 1992), for the latest word on this
matter from the point of view of a positivist.
23. MOfiL,
supra note 2, at 68-81. Formalism is a belief that legal dictates are
plainly and easily enforced according to their literal provisions.
24. See H.LA HART, THE CONcEr OF LAw 97-150 (1961).
25. See DLAs, supra note 22, at 348-51.
26. Id. at 351-56.

27. It is ironic that Germany's leading positivist, Hans Kelsen, and the man who
later became its leading proponent of natural law, Gustav Radbruch, both were
deprived of their jobs by the Nazis. See MOT.F, supra note 2, at 220.
28. Id. at 10-24. At least one other scholar agrees with Mfiller's analysis of the judiciary, but he describes the pre-war judges as anxious to embrace National Socialism's rise
because justice in the Weimar Republic had made their role too "political." See H.W.
KOCH, IN THE NAME OF THE VOuc PoLrIcALJusriCE IN HrTLER's GERMANY 7 (1989).
29. Koch essentially agrees with this. KOCH, supra note 28, at 7.
30. MOLLER, supra note 2, at 21-24.
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asserts that these judges quickly embraced an anti-rule of law approach.3 1
Mfiller indirectly suggests that the progress of the war as reflected in
German legal affairs was another cause of the Nazification of the law. It
seems indisputable that the total-war psychology and the realization that
Germany was losing facilitated the complete Nazification of German institutions. While Americans and others will perhaps sneer at the notion that
the state of war in Germany was any kind of an excuse, a deterioration of
legal functioning could be observed in analogous areas of British and
American life in the 1940s.32
Mfiller touches on but never develops an alternative causal explanation-namely, that German judges and law professors saw themselves
more as civil servants than as checks on possible excesses of executive and
legislative power,33 as in the American legal tradition. This promising
theme, if developed, would have synthesized a good deal of Mfiller's
materials.

M.

Failure of Individuals in the Legal System

While the foregoing discussion of causes may suggest some factors in the
process whereby the German legal system became a full partner in Nazi
genocide and terror, it skirts the most interesting issue. How did bourgeois German judges and law professors who, for the most part, were not
people with evil or nefarious pasts, continue to participate in such a charade of justice? Was it merely fear? Was it the undeniable and vicious
historical anti-Semitism of Central Europe? What happened to the
broadly liberal and deeply intellectual culture of learning achieved during
the nineteenth century in Germany? Are we all weak and sniveling creatures or, even worse, happy murderers on behalf of a cause when whipped
up by race-baiting demagogues like Goebbels and Hitler? For lawyers and
law professors, the particular question is: Are the lawyer's and judge's
tools and techniques, such as the claims of legal formality particularly in
the criminal law, so flimsy a protection against mass hysteria and vituperation? Some of these questions have been addressed in other scholarly writing, such as a fine study of the mechanics and effects of the Nazi takeover
in one German town,3 4 but no work has focused on the overall role and
31. Id. In a lengthy review of Miller's book, Professor Markus Dubber has argued
that the record of the German judiciary during the Nazi period was, in fact, a mixed
record of adherence to rule-of-law norms and abdication in the face of Nazism. See
Markus Dirk Dubber, Book Review, JudicialPositivism and Hitler's Injustice, 93 COLUM. L.
REv. 1807, 1815 (1993). For a specifically focused view also contrary to Miller's, see
MARc LINDER, THE SUPREME LABOR COURT IN NAZI GERMAN:. AJURISPRUDENTIAL ANALY

sis (1987). Linder concludes: "With notable exceptions the majority of the [Supreme
Labor Court's] decisions maintained the court's intellectual distance from the Nazi
regime." Id. at 61 (citation omitted).
32. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
33. MOLLER, supra note 2, at 7-9.
34. See genrrallyWITJAM SHERIDAN ALLEN, THE NAZI SEIZURE OF POWER: THE EXPERI.
ENCE OF A SINGLE GERMAN TOWN 1922-1945 (rev. ed. 1984).
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35
responsibilities of lawyers and judges.
Mfiller's only answer appears to be his claim that Germany really had
no entrenched "rule-of-law" tradition, 3 6 and arguments phrased in rule-oflaw terms were not made or were easily swept aside. 37 While I find this
probative, I think one has to look deeper to explain such a total nullification of legal norms, even by German standards, as Miller's research shows.
At the risk of speaking overbroadly, it seems to me that three additional explanations are plausible. The first posits that there was a sense of
failure (or a desire for revenge) associated with "Germanness." Germans
and Italians were the last two great peoples of Western Europe to unify as
nation-states. This late union was preceded by centuries of disorder and
disunity, of political, dynastic, and imperial failure and defeat at the hands
of the French, the English, and various international alliances. Thus
World War I and the defeat of Germany were not singlehandedly responsible for creating Nazism, but did serve to reinforce a sense of failure and a
38
thirst for revenge that abetted Nazism's rise.
A second explanation is that German legal institutions were quite
undeveloped because of the past history of political failure. For instance,
an American observer of the pre-Weimar and Weimar periods39 will be
struck by the primitiveness of German institutional and legal behavior as it
related to major national political questions.40 When confronted with an
environment of a claimed patriotic German "revival," followed by a German war, legal professionals disregarded claims of legal formality and the
concept ofjudicial independence.
Finally and most speculatively, it may be that while positivism is not an
appropriate target for "blame," the German tendency in law to overtheorize is partially responsible for what transpired. While I am not implying
that Germans are racially or genetically prone to overtheorization, I do
suggest that German legalism, particularly on the academic side, was characterized by a focus on abstraction starting at least at some point in the
nineteenth century.41 This characterization contrasts sharply with Britain
and the United States, but not, surprisingly, with Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., ajurist who has proven hard to categorize in the American context and

35. See, however, LNDER, supranote 31.
36. This claim is somewhat at variance with the introductory remarks contained in
KOCH, supra note 28, at 5-10.
37. MOLLER, supranote 2, at 10-24.
38. See KARL DIETRICH BRACHER, THE GERMAN DImEMM: THE THROES OF POLITICAL

EMANCIPATION 49-68 (Richard Barry trans., 1974), and F.L. Carsten, The HistorialRoots
of NationalSocialism, in UPHEAVAL AND CoNTmuIT.

A CENTURY OF GERMAN HISTORY 116-

33 (E.J. Feuchtwanger ed., 1974).
39. See generally GORDON A. CRAIG, THE GERMANS 15-34 (1982).
40. Id.
41. Even if this controversial statement is accepted, it leads naturally to the further
question of why overtheorization occurred. Of course this phenomenon in legal doctrine is consistent with the rich and diverse flowering of philosophy and theology in
nineteenth century Germany. But it may also be a function of the fact that because
there was no coherent body of "national" law, jurists directed their efforts to synthesizing the diverse strands that comprised the German legal tradition.

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

Vol. 28

who was strongly attracted to this aspect of German legalism. 42 It may be
that a thorough disembodiment of legal doctrine, no matter what the particular theoretical angle, is intrinsically a bad thing or at least potentially a
bad thing. For all of its untidiness and chaos, the Anglo-American common law system prevents a divorce of theoretical insights from practical
consequences. It also prevents volte-faces in the law, such as might be
thought to have occurred during the Nazi take-over. The common law
system denies that any formulation of doctrine is itself final or complete.
While the common law is not completely anti-theoretical, it erects bulwarks against a theoretical coup-d'&at, like Nazism, by its incrementalist
methodology, its focus on practical results, and its view that all legal doctrine is provisional.
IV. Analyzing the Legal Failure Using Fuller's Framework
But in the end, isn't Fuller, or that which Fuller never could quite say,
right? Law is not law in a society, and is not entitled to respect and prima
facie obedience, unless in a fairly comprehensive way it is based on and
furthers the pursuit of minimum goals of human dignity. The exact content of those minimum goals may not be absolutely fixed or invariable, but
there must be a substantial adherence to them. Perhaps this is so because,
as Thomas Aquinas believed, we can all "see" by reason a natural law of
human dignity.43 Or perhaps Jeremy Bentham is right to assert that this
minimum quantity of human dignity is best defined and calibrated in
terms of maximizing happiness for members of the group.4 4 Obviously
neither theory is deducible on purely logical grounds. However, even as
ultimately unprovable postulates they provide a more convincing and safer
account of law and its operation than a "valueless" positivist descriptivism.
The Mfiller book concludes by posing another question that is either
behavioral or social. The German experience with Nazism suggests that
once a society at war steps across a line and engages in genocide particularly against an identified group outside of the perceived mainstream, like
Jews, very few humans can summon up the courage to resist. Mfiller's
book cites only one case of a German judge officially and directly confronting the Nazis and their collaborators; interestingly, the Nazis dealt
with the judge fairly gently. 45 Mfiller also gives the example of the bishop
of Minster, obviously a non-legal figure, who sued the Nazis in connection
42. See generallySHELDON M. NovicE, HONORABLEJUSrncE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs 312-15 (1989). Some might interpret my comment as implying that
Holmes had the makings of a Nazi, but I do not believe that. On the other hand, I
believe that he loved abstracted theoretical discourse for its own sake more than anything else, and I find that potentially dangerous.

43. SeeJohn Finnis, NaturalLaw and Legal Reasoning, in NATURAL LAw THEORY* CONTEMPORARY EssAYs 134 (Robert P. George ed., 1992). See also Lloyd L. Weinreb, Natural
Law and Rights, in NATURAL LAW THEORY. CONTEMPORARY EssAYs 278 (Robert P. George

ed., 1992).
44. See Dts, supra note 22, at 427-29.
45. MOLLER, supranote 2, at 193-95.
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with the disappearance of a member of his flock 46 and also condemned
them in public homilies delivered in the midst of war. In addition, Mfiller
mentions a law professor who took early retirement because he believed
that his ideas were incompatible with those of the Nazi order.4 7
The docility of German lawyers and judges may not have been worse
than that of Germans in other occupations, but it does suggest that when a
legal order is taken over by a vicious and murderous clique, internal 48
resistance is not a viable option. The only effective response is to attack
the entire apparatus as an evil thing. The hard choice comes in deciding,
in contexts less clear than Germany's, whether the immorality is so
profound and pervasive as to justify full-fledged disobedience.
Conclusion
There is a related behavioral point. Based on the example of Germany, it
may be that once a legal order becomes preponderantly and demonstrably
immoral and jettisons the rule of law, it is extraordinarily difficult to stop
the slide toward even greater excesses. While some German legal figures
suggested a reformulation or "repackaging" of particularly offensive
results, 49 there is almost no evidence of legal arguments against or resistance to sending innocent human beings, including children, rabbis,
tailors, priests, foreigners, mundane criminals, farm laborers, etc., to summary executions or to camps for mass extermination.
In effect, this second point also may support Fuller's argument that
once a system violates certain internal "moral" constraints of legality (laws
must be publicly promulgated, laws can not generally be retroactive, etc.),
the entire order will collapse into substantive immorality (or vice versa) .5o
In framing his overall thesis that law requires the observance of an internal
morality, Fuller avoided the deeply divisive and irresolvable debate over
the rightness of a natural law approach or a conventionalist account of
minimum human rights, a debate that perhaps Fuller could never resolve
in his own mind. Yet, even though his avoidance may have been a controversialist's stratagem, it may be that he was still descriptively correct. While
theoretically one could conceive of a legal system that observed all of
Fuller's internal moral constraints and nonetheless was profoundly and
substantively immoral, in practical terms that combination is very unlikely
and in fact it did not present itself in Germany. In Germany, sadly, the
violation of the dictates of Fuller's internal morality was as massive as the
substantive degradation of the system's ends.

46. Id. at 127.
47. Id. at 69.
48. In his review, Professor Dubber, without claiming that "internal" resistance was
common, argues that Miller was uninterested in exploring the utility or prevalence of
"creative, narrow interpretations of Nazi laws." Dubber, supra note 31, at 1813-15.

49.

MOLLER,

supra note 2, at 148.

50. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALrr OF LAW 3-32, 95-151 (2d ed. 1969).

